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Abstract 
In recent years, there has been a panoply of new forms of ‘social’ government, as 
manifest in ‘social enterprise’ and ‘social media’. This follows an era of neoliberalism 
in which social logics were apparently being eliminated, through the expansion of 
economic rationalities. To understand this, the paper explores the critique of the very 
notion of the ‘social’, as manifest in neoliberal contributions to the socialist calculation 
debate from the 1920s onwards. Understood as a zone lying between market and 
state, the social was accused by Mises and Hayek of being both unaccountable 
(lacking any units of measurement) and formless (lacking instruments of explication). 
The paper then asks to what extent these critiques still retain their purchase, 
following recent developments in hedonic measurement and data analytics. The 
argument is made that new post-neoliberal forms of ‘social government’ may now be 
entirely plausible, although operating around the corporation rather than the state.    
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Writing in 1979, at the dawn of the era that would come to be known as 
‘neoliberalism’, Friedrich von Hayek voiced his frustration with the term ‘social’. It is, 
he argued: 
 
the weasel-word par excellence. Nobody knows what it actually means. But it 
is definitely true that a social market economy is no market economy... social 
justice is not justice - and I am afraid a social democracy is no democracy 
either. 
(Quoted in Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009) 
 
In a 1987 interview, Margaret Thatcher uttered the phrase that, fairly or otherwise, 
would come to symbolize her political program, “there is no such thing as society”. To 
the extent that the ‘social’ was associated with state-centric rationalities, policies and 
measurements - as in ‘social security’, ‘social policy’ and the ‘social problem’ - the 
period which followed the crisis of Keynesianism appeared to move beyond the 
‘social’ as a dominant mode of problematisation and government (Rose, 1996). 
Individuals would now be viewed as ‘entrepreneurs of themselves’, entering into 
alliances and communities, in addition to market exchanges, but less commonly 
viewed via the societal aggregations and stratifications offered by social statistics or 
sociology (Rose, 1999; Foucault, 2008). The decline of state socialism further 
weakened the explanatory power of ‘social’ categories (Eyal et al, 2003). Running in 
parallel to this, and contributing to it, the social sciences witnessed various forms of 
‘economic imperialism’, in which theories of rational choice expanded into spheres of 
non-market relations, explaining various forms of social, moral and political action as 
if they were calculated in price terms (Fine, 1998, 2001, 2002). The idea of the 
‘social’ as external or excessive to the price system, as posited by welfare 
economics, was abandoned under the influence of Chicago School economics 
(Coase, 1960).  
 
At least on a rhetorical level, the ‘social’ appears to have experienced something of a 
revival in the early 21st century. The term now prefixes a wide variety of managerial, 
methodological and governmental strategies. This includes activities and institutions 
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that derive from business management, such as ‘social marketing’, ‘social enterprise’ 
and ‘social entrepreneurship’. Linked to this are new modes of accounting, such as 
‘social valuation’ and ‘social return on investment’. It also includes medical and 
biological fields of expertise, such as ‘social neuroscience’ and ‘social prescribing’, 
which view loneliness – inadequate sociality – as a health risk.i Perhaps most 
significantly, it is witnessed in the dramatic growth of ‘social media’, whose 
widespread use permits large-scale quantitative research via techniques of ‘social 
analytics’, themselves derivative of longer-standing methods of ‘social network 
analysis’. That social research can now be conducted at vast scale, at minimal 
marginal cost, thanks to the digitization of social relations, opens up new possibilities 
for social science, though poses the question of whether and how sociology 
(traditionally understood) will gain access to these new opportunities (Savage & 
Burrows, 2007).  
 
The observation that there are various new ‘socials’ in circulation immediately invites 
two possible responses, one skeptical and the other teleological. The skeptical 
response is that this adoption of the prefix ‘social’ is simply a disguise for various 
neoliberal rationalities which are fundamentally unchanged. Indeed, it might be 
argued that they highlight quite how advanced the colonization of the ‘social’ by the 
economic has now become. Hence, ‘social marketing’ is simply the expansion of 
marketing rationalities into social policy; ‘social enterprise’ is the invasion of private 
sector management into the third sector; ‘social return on investment’ sees yet more 
values converted into monetary value, through accounting innovations.  
 
The teleological response is, from the point of view of both sociologists and 
socialists, an optimistic one. By this account, these various scattered ‘socials’ 
indicate a residue of collectivity, that might gradually accumulate and cohere into 
some type of social actor or class. The reappearance of the ‘social’ reflects the 
impossibility of containing all human conduct within regimes of price-based 
calculation. ‘Externalities’ are becoming more pervasive and problematic, especially 
where goods are intangible in nature, and traditional economic valuation techniques 
are failing to cope (Callon, 1998; Hardt & Negri, 2005; Arvidsson & Peitersen, 2013). 
Just as Marx believed that capitalism contained the seeds of socialism, due to its 
reliance on co-operation in the factory, the teleological view of the new ‘socials’ is 
that they are point towards the conditions of a future collective, class or society.  
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Since 2013, both of these positions have met a highly significant challenge, following 
Edward Snowden’s revelations that social media and telecom companies had been 
complicit in state surveillance on an unprecedented scale. This suggests an alliance 
between the classically state-led envisioning of ‘society’ and the new, decentralized, 
individualized ‘social’ underpinned by social media. Significantly, one of the defences 
that the security services mounted of their activities was that they were not interested 
in the content of citizens’ communications, but only in the meta-data which connected 
them. Yet this pointed precisely to the newly emerging rationality of government, in 
which patterns, connections and relations are the object of knowledge, and not 
individuals as such.  
 
How then should we approach the question of the ‘social’, in ways that take it 
seriously while nevertheless avoiding its potential seductions? Can we recognize the 
new ‘social’ as something other than simply neoliberalism in disguise, while still 
remaining critical and, where necessary, fearful of the possibilities opened up by new 
infrastructures of connectivity? And can we do so, without entirely ruling out the 
possibility that the new social may contain seeds of new political mobilisations and 
modes of resistance? In this paper, I pursue this problem in one particular way, 
influenced by what Boltanski terms the ‘sociology of critique’ (Boltanski & Thevenot, 
1999; Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007; Boltanski, 2012). This tradition views critique as 
immanent to social and political practice, and constitutive of institutions. How people 
or things are judged, criticized and evaluated shapes how specific inequalities (be 
they of power, wealth, voice etc) are rendered acceptable or not. For certain 
conventions of behavior, including those of calculated and competitive behavior, to 
be recognized as acceptable, certain moral principles of evaluation have to be 
presumed by the various actors who are party to them. These principles can be 
excavated genealogically and hermeneutically, thereby bringing to light the 
presuppositions that actors hold in common but may not articulate.    
 
The remainder of the paper is in four parts. The next section reflects more closely on 
the meaning of the ‘social’. It reviews Foucault’s analysis of ‘civil society’, as a 
domain of freedom that lies between individual economic rationality and state juridical 
rationality. The following section turns to the roots of neoliberal thought in the 
socialist calculation debate of the 1920s and ‘30s, and aims to pinpoint key ‘anti-
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social’ characteristics of neoliberal critique. The question is then posed: to what 
extent does this foundational neoliberal critique still stand up, nearly a century later? 
My answer is that, while the neoliberal critique of state-oriented ‘society’ retains its 
purchase, neoliberal thought offers no critique of a somewhat different ‘social’, which 
is emergent from individual rationality. This parallel notion of the social acquires 
tangible modes of management and government, thanks to biological and digital 
modes of representation that emerged concurrently with neoliberalism.  
 
 
Between law and economics 
 
Clearly the ‘social’ is amenable to multiple, sometimes conflicting interpretations. For 
example, there is not necessarily any contradiction between agreeing that “there is 
no such thing as society” and worrying about “anti-social behavior”. However, it may 
be helpful and possible to impose some limits around the question of the ‘social’, and 
to do so using certain commonly understood historical markers. The ‘social’ that 
appeared to be in decline from the 1970s onwards was one that emerged during the 
late 19th century, due to the invention of specific techniques of aggregation, 
surveillance and intervention, which together produced an empirical object known as 
‘society’ (Donzelot, 1991; Poovey, 1995). Society, viewed this way, is “the sum of the 
bonds and relations between individuals and events - economic, moral, political - 
within a more or less bounded territory governed by its own laws” (Rose, 1996: 328). 
The discipline of sociology drew on many of the new empirical methodologies and 
logics that were developing over the course of the 19th century, enabling it to be 
established as a science distinct from economics following the marginal revolution of 
the 1870s.  
 
However, it is worth also remembering what preceded this governmental and 
infrastructural invention of ‘society’, and indeed facilitated it. As various pragmatist 
sociologists and historians of social science have demonstrated, prior to the empirical 
investigation of ‘society’ were certain philosophical and moral presuppositions, 
regarding common humanity and moral sentiment which arose during the 
Enlightenment (Hawthorn, 1987). Sociological and statistical projects of aggregation 
and averaging (what might be called ‘political physics’) only acquire their normative 
authority on the prior assumption that there is some form of common will (or ‘political 
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metaphysics’), that cannot be expressed via the market (Desrosieres, 1998). 
Rousseau’s idea of the ‘General Will’ and Kant’s theory of the ‘categorical imperative’ 
both offer metaphysical bases on which to view all human beings as united by a 
normative consensus, not reducible to their private desires. The ‘social’, by these 
accounts, is a paradoxical form of spontaneous order in which individuals achieve 
autonomy through obedience to commonly observed rules.  
 
The enigma of the social, in this Enlightenment sense, lies in its ambivalent technical 
implications. Will it be the state or the market which makes it operative and empirical, 
which converts this political metaphysics into political physics? The example of 
Rousseau, and the statistical traditions which followed the French Revolution, 
provide a relatively clear answer: the common good will become manifest and 
empirical via the state. However, if the emergent spontaneity of the social is to be 
taken seriously, then this cannot be the end of the matter. As Foucault argues in his 
genealogy of economic liberalism, it is market mechanisms that bring individuals 
together without coercion, from where they are then able to form common bonds and 
mutual sympathy of their own accord (Foucault, 2008: 294-298). The enigma of the 
social, for Foucault, is that it arises as a side-effect of the free market, but is not in 
itself calculable by the free market. This problem would later be captured by 
economists in the concept of the market ‘externality’: that which is valuable but not 
priceable (Pigou, 1912). The social shares certain characteristics with the market – 
spontaneity, equilibrium, individual self-interest – but then produces types of bond 
and normativity which are antagonistic to market governance. In Foucault’s analysis, 
the problem of state rule in the late 18th century is that, in contrast to the Hobbesian 
problematic of the 17th century, the state confronts an already-existing, relatively 
harmonious social order, which is not purely dependent on sovereign law. 
 
The paradox or ambiguity of the social is therefore that it exists at the meeting point 
between two antagonistic logics. The individualistic, calculative logic of the market 
runs up against the collectivist, juridical logic of the state. The two operate in parallel, 
mutually contradictory spaces, yet somehow have to function alongside each other. 
Foucault claims that the emergence of a third sphere, known as ‘civil society’, arises 
precisely in order to manage this tension, mediating between the juridical and the 
economic. What he suggests, then, is that the ‘social’ in its Enlightenment form 
operates as a buffer zone between sovereign normativity and individual interests, 
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that is, between law and economics. Enigmatic, even paradoxical, visions of a 
spontaneous, self-governing collective, such as the ‘General Will’ or the ‘categorical 
imperative’, should be understood in this context.  
 
Against this longer genealogical backdrop, the ‘social’ which emerged during the late 
19th century, and arguably went into retreat from the 1970s onwards, was merely one 
possible empirical and technical ‘fix’ of the social. It attempted to deal with the innate 
ambivalence of the social, through juridical and other state means, to the neglect of 
the other half of the problem, namely its spontaneous and quasi-individualist quality. 
One particular form of state-oriented political physics was applied to stabilize political 
metaphysics. The buffer zone between law and economics was dealt with through an 
expansion of state rationalities, in the form of statistics, welfare policies, which 
extended beyond the state (Rose & Miller, 1992). Hence ‘society’ and ‘social’ came 
to refer to objects and problems that existed at a national level.  
 
 
Neoliberalism as ‘anti-social’ 
 
In 1919, the Austrian philosopher Otto Neurath published an article entitled ‘The War 
Economy’ (Neurath, 2005). Neurath argued that state-run wartime economies 
achieved higher levels of efficiency than market economies, as the value of goods 
was accounted for ‘in kind’ rather than via the mediating calculation of market prices, 
suggesting that planned economies might also be more efficient. By relying on 
market prices for their allocation of resources, liberal market economies were likely to 
be distracted by monetary valuations (that is, exchange value) and therefore fail to 
produce an optimal quantity of goods that were actually needed and desired (that is, 
use value). A year later, Ludwig Von Mises responded critically to this argument with 
Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth, followed by a much longer 
critique of socialism in 1922 (Mises, 1990, 2009). This developed into the famous on-
going exchange, known as the ‘socialist calculation debate’, which continued until 
World War Two, drawing in leading economists (such as Pigou), Karl Polanyi, Hayek 
and, most decisively on the socialist side, Oskar Lange.  
 
The details of the socialist calculation debate have been covered at length elsewhere 
(Steele, 1992; Cockshott & Cottrell, 1993; Greenwood, 2006). I want to explore it 
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here for one specific reason: to understand neoliberal thought as a specific critique of 
the ‘social’, as a knowable, manageable, measurable and governable sphere of 
human activity (Gane, 2014). The roots of neoliberalism can justifiably be traced to 
this critical exchange, when Mises and Hayek first confronted socialist intellectual 
opponents who claimed to possess the technical and methodological wherewithal to 
govern an economy without mediation by market prices (Gane, 2013). In response, 
not only was the rationality and viability of a planned economy systematically 
criticised, but the justification for the price system (and the state’s role in facilitating it) 
was refreshed, leading various scholars to start designing the conditions and policies 
for a neoliberal economy (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009; Peck, 2010; Burgin, 2013; 
Dardot & Laval, 2014).  
 
The crucial claim made by those contributors sympathetic to socialism was that there 
were technical and institutional instruments available to policy-makers, to allocate 
resources efficiently, without relying on market mechanisms. Many of these 
instruments were inventions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, such as 
Taylorism and Walrasian equilibrium models and so on. Lange argued that while 
prices were indeed necessary for resources to be allocated efficiently, a price was 
simply the “terms on which alternatives were offered”, and needn’t be generated by 
an actual market transaction, but possibly by Walrasian economics (quoted in 
Caldwell, 1997). The technical and methodological advances that were unleashed by 
the marginal revolution, the ‘second industrial revolution’ and state bureaucratization 
were seized as providing a more advanced alternative to the price system.  
 
In important ways, the neoliberal critique of socialist planning was not simply based 
on alternative normative presuppositions, but on a precise diagnosis of the technical 
and epistemological problems of modernity. In order to understand the 'spirit' of 
neoliberal critique more broadly, I want to characterize two dimensions of this 
diagnosis. Firstly, there is a critique of the incommensurability of value, in the 
absence of a price system, as advanced by Mises. Secondly, there is a critique of the 
performativity of knowledge, in a society governed by intellectuals, as advanced by 
Hayek. I turn to each of these in turn, with the aim of later considering the fate of 
these two critical capacities.  
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Commensurability critique 
The commensurability argument, which is principally found in the work of Mises, 
derives from a Weberian assumption that it is impossible to achieve any measure of 
substantive ends. As subjective orientations on the world, values only achieve any 
consensual objectivity via the instruments we use to pursue them and, where 
possible, compare them. Existing as internal psychological states or tastes, values 
themselves are incommensurable; they cannot be accounted for directly. If there 
were something like a ‘general will’ shared by all, it would lie outside of the domain of 
rationality, and we would have no means of knowing what it was in itself.  
 
Mises’s argument is an expansion of a marginalist worldview, to encompass broader 
sociological problems of rationality. In this respect, he can be viewed as one of the 
founders of the ‘economic imperialism’ that was later associated with the Chicago 
School of neo-classical economics (Gane, 2013). For Mises, economics is not a 
theory of the economy, but a "universally valid science of human action" (Mises, 
1960: 19). But the ‘ordinal revolution’ which took place within marginalist utility theory 
during the 1880s is also crucial for Mises’s critique of socialism. As he argues, 
“judgements of value do not measure; they merely establish grades and scales" or 
what economists would refer to as ‘preferences’ (Mises, 1990: 9). This ordinal notion 
of utility is a rejection of the Benthamite marginalism of Jevons and Edgeworth, which 
presumed that prices were a proportionate reflection of quantities of psychological 
gratification, and that other instruments (such as Edgeworth’s imaginary 
‘hedonimetre’) could plausibly be built in order to gauge this (Colander, 2007; Hands, 
2009). Bentham himself had wondered whether human pulse rate, in addition to 
money, might serve as a means of measuring quantities of pleasure (McReynolds, 
1968). If the ordinal revolution in utility theory were reversed, a key plank in Mises’s 
argument for monetary calculation would be undermined. If, that is, experts did 
acquire the capacity to measure psychological experiences directly, then the problem 
of socialist commensurability would in principle be solvable.  
 
The principle focus of Mises’s critique is socialist manufacturing. He grants that a 
socialist society could make use of a market price system in consumer goods, which 
would avoid the need to discover people’s private values. But socialism could not be 
socialism, if it involved private ownership of ‘factors of production’ (capital equipment 
etc), and without private ownership there could be no free market in these goods. 
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Hence, the price of productive goods could never emerge spontaneously, making 
their value impossible to ascertain. The socialist state would become embroiled in 
questions of how much productive capacity to invest in, which it could not answer 
without simply guessing what future human needs and desires might consist of. It 
would be, in Mises’s famous phrase, “only groping in the dark” (Mises, 1990: 17).  
 
Despite the considerable transformations within neoliberal thought following World 
War Two, the technical problem of commensurability remained pivotal for this 
intellectual tradition. Milton Friedman’s seminal essay, ‘The Methodology of Positive 
Economics’, offered a behaviorist defense of neo-classical economics (Friedman, 
1953). In this, the problem of incommensurable moral values, over which “men can 
ultimately only fight”, remained central (1953). This can equally be seen in the work 
of Gary Becker, for whom neo-classical economics is merely an ‘approach’ which 
respects the infinite heterogeneity of human desires and concerns, while also 
processing them in quantitative terms (Becker, 1976). The Chicago School argument 
in favour of using positive economics as a tool of policy-making is no different from 
Mises’s arguments for markets, namely that these are the only instruments through 
which conflicting values can be compared. Economics acquires a pragmatic 
justification as the best available intermediary in a complex liberal society. 
 
Performativity critique 
Mises acknowledges that socialism would be feasible and efficient if the economy 
entered a ‘static state’ (1990: 16). If industrial or social progress came to a halt for 
any reason, the problem of calculation would disappear: firms would simply produce 
the same thing year after year, which corresponded to unchanging consumer values. 
This reminds us that a principle neoliberal justification for the market, at least within 
the Austrian School, is that it is intrinsically dynamic, granting it a unique role in the 
government of modern societies. In the absence of modernity, this justification 
dissolves. The socialist argument that Walrasian equations could be used in place of 
market prices, that is an efficient price could be calculated on paper, misses this 
decisive aspect of a market price, namely that it has a practical function in mediating 
change. The price system is a computer which we inhabit, providing the very 
conditions of our existential futurity, and cannot be adequately be replaced with a 
computer or model.  
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This practical function of the price system becomes even more important in the work 
of Hayek, who re-founds the critique of socialism on epistemological grounds (Hayek, 
1942, 1943, 1945, 1949). This rests on what we might term an argument about 
performativity: for Hayek, knowledge is initially without any form, and only acquires 
form through the help of particular artifices. Knowledge is primarily embodied and 
tacit, posing a question as to how it can become shared across large, complex 
societies. The solution of social scientists and socialists is to ignore the various 
formless knowledges that are scattered across society, and impose form upon 
society from above, through theories and statistical aggregations of the social. 
Society is thereby performed by the state, but the heterogeneous knowledge 
possessed by the members of that society remains formless. The scientistic error of 
social science and socialism is to view society like a natural object, and not to 
recognize that it is already constituted by knowledge, and cannot be known 
‘objectively’ without doing some violence to this ontology (Hayek, 1942). 
 
The market acquires an epistemological justification, which would shape subsequent 
neoliberal thinking (Mirowski, 2009, 2013). What the market is uniquely able to do is 
give form to distributed, embodied, unreflective forms of individual knowledge, by 
channeling this knowledge into the price system. The market has an instrument – 
monetary pricing – which is performative in everyday life. This is in stark contrast to 
the various expert instruments (accounting, statistics etc) on which socialist planning 
would depend. If the ‘social’ as a zone of human interaction hovers between the 
juridical and the economic, Hayek is effectively posing a choice as to how it will 
thereby be rendered explicit: will it be via a tool of individual choice, or a tool of state 
aggregation? In that sense, the market arguably rescues the spontaneity of the 
‘social’, even while it abandons its normative and general dimension. The market, 
from a Hayekian perspective, is a spontaneous social order.  
 
The post-War Chicago School tradition abandoned Hayek’s pragmatic skepticism, in 
favour of a far more confident positivism (Van Horn et al, 2011). But the task of 
constructing performative instruments of knowledge was implicitly still fundamental. 
What defines Chicago economics is the extension of price theory into domains where 
it was previously absent – the state, the future, education, the family and so on (Fine, 
1998, 2002; Nik-Khah & Van Horn, 2012). The construction of new techniques of 
non-market calculation implicitly (sometimes explicitly) seeks a performative role, 
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facilitating calculation where it was previously absent. Markets, from a Chicago 
perspective, do not need a formal analysis, as they already possess formality. Where 
economic analysis is needed is precisely where costs and benefits are lacking any 
formal definition (such as government bureaucracies), hence new calculative 
techniques are needed which will make them explicit and calculable. Various 
scholars have now shown how successful economists have been in constructing 
performative devices (MacKenzie, 2006; MacKenzie et al, 2007). It needs stressing 
that performativity is strongest (that is, economics is only necessary) in areas such 
as human capital or futures where the market requires additional calculative 
assistance from economics. If we accept that performativity arises in cases where 
economics is expanding imperialistically, then the performativity of economics can be 
witnessed as a distinctly neoliberal achievement.  
 
The post-social 
What is distinctive about such neoliberal arguments is that they do not offer a 
narrowly utilitarian case for markets, but ground their justifications in more 
fundamental problems of modernity. For Mises, this is the impossibility of measuring 
values directly; for Hayek, it is the formlessness of human knowledge. Markets are 
deliberate political constructions aimed at coping with these problems. But the 
classically liberal separation of state, market and civil society no longer applies, once 
markets are performing this much more extensive moral and epistemological role. 
Rather than a social mediator between state and market, what neoliberals propose is 
some sort of fusion of law and economics. This fusion comes in two main traditions – 
an ordoliberal tradition which aims to infuse market institutions with juridical authority 
(Gerber, 1994; Bonefeld, 2012), and a Chicago School tradition which aims to 
rationalise juridical authority via the psychology of incentives (Van Horn, 2011; 
Davies, 2010). In policy implications, the two are quite divergent, especially with 
respect to the question of monopoly (Gerber, 1998). Yet both can be seen as efforts 
to overcome the ambiguity or paradox of the social, through forcing juridical and 
economic logic together. Rather than an ambiguous buffer zone between state and 
market, which neoliberal critique views as liable to be flooded by the state, 
neoliberalism brings state and market into a carefully constructed fusion with each 
other.  
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For neoliberals, it must never be clear where the market ends and the state begins, 
or else a conflict may arise between the two which risks opening up the space of the 
‘social’ as neither calculative nor juridical. The post-social polity that results from this 
fusion does not, therefore, contain conventional market or state institutions, in the 
liberal sense of either. Instead, there is an interlocking relationship between 
calculating individuals and carefully calibrated public institutions, as Bentham first 
envisaged (Engelmann, 2003). Rendering all values explicit (either via markets or via 
economics) allows them to be commensurable and performative. This is a particular 
strategic solution to the problem of the ambiguous ‘social’, which seeks to eradicate 
that ambiguity. 
 
 
Crises of neoliberalism 
 
When contemporary neoliberalism is afflicted by crises of various kinds, a default 
interpretation is to explain them in terms of faulty ‘incentives’. This extends across 
domains of public policy, where ‘behaviour change’ has become a preoccupation in 
areas such as health and social policy, and within the private sector, where the 2007-
09 financial crisis has been widely attributed to badly designed performance-related 
pay schemes and governance models. This resort to psychological interpretation 
may appear like wishful thinking, which ignores the broader institutional frameworks 
of market and state. But it is also necessary to see that, when ‘incentives’ fail, 
neoliberalism faces an existential crisis, which can only be alleviated by exceptional 
and violent measures.  
 
The rise of behavioural economics as a tool of public policy-making and governance 
design can be understood against this backdrop. While the psychological study of 
behavioural influence can be traced back to the early twentieth century, the 
distinctive contribution of behavioural economics is to identify the precise limits of 
calculative rationality, and the entry point into normativity (Heukelom, 2006, 2011). In 
terms of the history of neoliberal government, the adoption of behavioural economics, 
as popularized in the notion of ‘nudges’, is therefore a defensive move, which seeks 
to prop up juridical-economic instruments and avoid the reappearance of the ‘social’ 
understood (in this instance) as undesirable ‘herd behavior’. By accommodating an 
element of normativity within incentive schemes (that is, seeking to normalize rational 
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behavior in relation to nutrition, financial management etc), behavioural economics 
seeks to rescue neoliberal government from a more wholesale normative and social 
challenge (Langley & Leaver, 2012; Wilkins, 2013). Normativity is tested through 
experimentation, and then instrumentalised accordingly. This supports new forms of 
behavioural government, in which uncalculated exchange and promises are used 
strategically in order to produce commitments to new patterns of behavior. 
 
The notion of an ‘incentive’ is sufficiently malleable as to replace virtually all other 
institutional categories, thereby blurring the distinction between state and market. An 
incentive is simply a governmental-psychological construction which achieves the 
two properties that Mises and Hayek initially identified with the price system, namely 
commensurability and performativity. Incentives are instruments (monetary or 
otherwise) which can transcend the conflict between multiple subjective values (they 
render human psychology commensurable) and provide explicit pathways for 
conduct (they are performative). The failure of incentives is therefore registered to the 
extent that they cease to function in this commensurating and performative manner. 
If they no longer appear to govern people in a standardized fashion, or are unable to 
formalize various important costs and benefits, then they encounter crisis. 
 
Many of the new forms of ‘social’ government identified at the outset can be 
understood in terms of this type of incentive crisis. Attempts to capture ‘social value’, 
through innovative forms of accounting and cost-benefit analysis, expand the reach 
of incentive systems, so as to encompass a broader range of costs and benefits 
while seeking to avoid the problems of socialist calculation; price remains the key 
instrument of measurement and decision-making (Fourcade, 2011). Embedding 
‘social enterprise’ within frameworks of monetary valuation, such as ‘social return on 
investment’, is a means of pursuing various forms of ‘positive externalities’ without 
forsaking the commensuration and performativity offered by economics and markets 
(Hall, 2014). 
 
However, there are other forms of new social government that are much less easy to 
explain in terms of expanded neoliberalism, and these require their own separate 
genealogy. To the extent that these are resistant to the original neoliberal critique of 
the social, for specific technical reasons, they potentially offer a new basis for 
social(ist) government that cannot be simply explained away as neoliberalism in 
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disguise. This is not to say that they are necessarily emancipatory or normatively 
desirable, only that they offer viable alternatives to the neoliberal emphasis on price, 
and must be taken seriously as elements of a post-neoliberal paradigm. 
 
Moral commensurability after neoliberalism 
The neoliberal critique of social government, that it would lack a unit of account for 
needs and demands, rested on the assumption that utility can only be captured in 
ordinal terms, that is, as ranked preferences. Various challenges to this assumption 
developed during the late 20th century, such as ‘happiness economics’, which have 
since contributed to the renewal of ‘social’ government. Underlying these is a more 
fundamental trend, that can be understood as the medicalization of value, and whose 
origins lie in the immediate post-War period, though well outside the purview of 
neoliberal theoretical development. Mises’s argument can withstand socialist claims 
about the centralized calculability of preferences, but is far more vulnerable to the 
challenged posed by new psychosomatic definitions of health.  
 
The World Health Organisation was founded in 1948 with a new definition of health 
as a “state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing”. This allows for 
questions of ‘health’ and ‘illness’ to be carried beyond the somatic realm, and to 
penetrate psychic and relational spheres of existence. Various things follow from this. 
Firstly, the subjective experience of health becomes one of its critical indicators and 
components (Armstrong, 2008). This became more explicit with the rise of ‘Quality of 
Life’ discourses and measures in healthcare during the 1970s (Benzer, 2011). 
Positive and negative feedback loops between psychological and physiological 
experiences of ‘wellness’ start to enter the considerations of health policy, and the 
problem of psychosomatic illness grows more acute. Secondly, the problem of health 
shifts from a binary one of ‘ill’ or ‘healthy’, to one of endless bio-psycho-social 
optimization, which never reaches its target. This means that the reach of health 
policy can potentially permeate all domains of activity, so long as there is adequate 
surveillance. Thirdly, new types of expert are required to judge and measure health in 
this broader holistic sense. These bring with them new types of intervention, aimed at 
promoting general activity and reducing stress, problems that incentive-based forms 
of policy intervention struggle to cope with.  
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Subjective valuation retains a prominent position within this epistemological 
paradigm, but this valuation is itself no longer considered beyond the limits of 
scientific measurement and comparison. With the discovery of anti-depressants in 
the late 1950s and surging rates of depression diagnosis in advanced economies 
from the 1970s onwards, the problem of utility (or hedonia) became not only cardinal, 
but biological, rooted in brain chemistry (Healy, 1997; Rose, 2003). The question of 
how to produce happiness and ‘wellbeing’ became a matter of medical and economic 
priority, which involved the creation of new scales to measure psychological 
satisfaction. Various psychological scales were invented in the early 1960s aimed at 
representing mental wellbeing, such as the Hamilton Depression Scale (1960) and 
the Beck Depression Inventory (1961). In 1965, the pollster Albert Cantril published 
The Pattern of Human Concerns, containing the first attempt to compare entire 
nations according to reported happiness (Cantril, 1965). In the 1970s, this sort of 
data began to be used by economists for the first time, alongside the ‘social 
indicators movement’, to produce new ways of measuring national progress, which 
challenged Gross Domestic Product (Easterlin, 1974; Innes, 1989). 
 
This congregation of medical, psychiatric, psychological and economic 
methodologies for measuring subjective wellbeing faciliates a return to cardinal utility, 
of the sort proposed by Bentham and the early English marginalists. Since the 1990s, 
this has accelerated, with the emergence of distinctive fields of ‘happiness 
economics’ and ‘neuroeconomics’, the latter purporting to identify utility with a 
particular quantifiable neurochemical, namely dopamine (Kahneman et al, 1997, 
1999; Zizzo, 2002; Caplin & Dean, 2008). ‘Smart’ mobile technologies and bodily 
sensing devices allow for measurements of stress or happiness to be conducted 
beyond the limits of laboratory experiments or surveys, potentially allowing for 
constant evaluation of wellbeing, where individuals are willing to co-operate with such 
methods (Davies, 2015). National wellbeing measures have now been adopted by a 
number of national statistical agencies around the world.  
 
Whether or not these developments have in practice undermined neoliberal tools of 
government, they have undermined a critical justification for monetary pricing, 
namely that there is no alternative means of comparing subjective valuations. The 
assumption of ordinal utility by Mises, or of methodological behaviourism by 
Friedman, becomes increasingly untenable, in the face of authoritative cognitive, 
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medical and neuroscientific accounts of happiness. In the face of these new utilitarian 
sciences, economists who wish to retain a behaviorist ‘revealed preference’ theory 
are required to fall back on purely normative, liberal justifications (e.g. Saint-Paul, 
2011). The privileged technical position of the market, vis a vis the commensurability 
of value, is lost.  
 
Social performativity after neoliberalism 
What I have termed neoliberalism’s ‘performativity’ justification for the price system 
rested on the fact that the market was uniquely able to compute distributed, often 
instinctive forms of knowledge, in real-time. Formal alternatives, such as general 
equilibrium models, were simply too complex to compute. In response to growing 
computing power in the late 20th century, the case for socialist calculation was 
revived by Marxist computer scientists who argued that the proposals of Lange in the 
1930s were now a technical possibility (Cockshott & Cottrell, 1993, 1999). Yet this 
still misses the distinctly performative quality of the market (and of economics) as a 
way of mediating and explicating uncertain, tacit forms of knowledge. Neoliberal 
critique suggests that if knowledge is not to be performed by prices, then it will 
necessarily be performed by the state, in the form of social science and statistics. 
Computing power does not by itself weaken this critique. But the digitization of 
enacted social relations potentially does.  The social might thereby be performed 
through a form of sociology that is emergent from individual action, challenging 
economics through additional quantification and calculation of everyday life, rather 
than less (Latour & Lepinay, 2009).  
 
Social network analysis dates back to the ‘sociograms’ produced by Jacob Moreno in 
schools and prisons in the early 1930s (Freeman, 2004; Moreno, 1953). Moreno 
believed that he was bringing psychoanalysis out of the restricted private setting that 
Freud had located it in, and into everyday life, to produce a science of social 
relations, but without tipping into socialist or statistical aggregation (Marineau, 1989). 
American culture appeared to offer a route between excessive individualism (which 
he accused Freud of) and excessive state power, which Moreno saw as latent within 
sociology and Marxism. Moreno therefore shared much of the neoliberal critique of 
the social, understood as a state-led aggregation, but set about inventing a new 
method which aimed to grasp the social as emergent from individual freedom. 
Studying and mapping social relations would offer a way of knowing the social, which 
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nevertheless respected the autonomy of the individual. Sociograms were the visual 
representation of social networks, as we now know them.  
 
In common with socialist calculation, a significant methodological obstacle standing 
in the way of this new social science was the computational requirements that it 
encountered. The number of potential connections within a network rises 
exponentially as the size of the network increases. It wasn’t until the 1960s that 
computer software was developed to assist with this sort of analysis, and the number 
of software packages to carry out social network analysis grew rapidly during the 
1970s (Freeman, 2004). Thanks to computation, a new technical representation of 
the ‘social’ was now possible, built up from spontaneous individual interaction, rather 
than from aggregation. But data still needed to be collected by specialist social 
network analysts, and the methodology could not therefore be performative in 
everyday life. It was decentralized in its methodological assumptions, but not its 
practical applicability. The Hayekian justification for price calculations, namely that 
they are distributed across society, giving form to tacit knowledge, remains in tact. 
 
It is against this backdrop that the significance of social media and ubiquitous 
digitisation, for the genealogy of neoliberalism, can be understood. Social media 
offers a technology which formalizes everyday social life, in ways that are neither 
reducible to price, nor deduced from centralized statistics. As a set of mediating 
devices and conventions, social media combines with network analysis (often known 
in a business context as ‘social analytics’) in much the same way that markets 
combine with neo-classical economics. The everyday user performs their social life 
via facebook, twitter et al, while the expert contributes to this new formatting of the 
‘social’ through application of methodological techniques for spotting the movement 
of trends and behaviours. Computer power itself is not enough to defy the neoliberal 
critique of socialist calculation, so long as computers remain restricted to the role of 
centralized model-builders. Hayek’s argument is not that markets work uniquely in 
theory, but that they work uniquely in practice, as means of performing everyday 
calculation. However, when computer power is decentralized, and operative in 
everyday social interaction, this claim for the indispensability of the market begins to 
disintegrate. When computation becomes entangled in real-time interaction, the 
viability of socialist calculation looks far more plausible (Dyer-Witheford, 2013). 
Questions do, however, remain regarding who the new social analysts are likely to 
 19 
be, and with what agenda. At present, they appear congregated within corporations 
and agencies which serve them. 
 
New Social Governance   
If these new possibilities for value commensuration and social performativity are 
taken seriously, what new types of social governance or rationality might thereby be 
likely? To put this in much grander terms, what is it that comes after neoliberalism? 
We should be wary of exaggerating here, for much of the apparatus that we 
recognize as neoliberalism is evidently still in place. The attempt to govern through 
incentives (albeit, with an enriched behaviorist account of how these work 
empirically) remains dominant. But new techniques of the ‘social’ are beginning to re-
open a distinct space of spontaneous-yet-collective activity, which is not reducible to 
either market or state.  
 
This can be seen where the two technical advances noted above – the return to 
cardinal utility and the digitization of social relations – occur in tandem with one 
another. It is widely recognized that social media offers new forms of consumer 
insight, through ‘sentiment analysis’ and mapping patterns of links and ‘likes’ 
(Arvidsson, 2011; Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013). This potentially provides the basis for a 
new system of value commensuration, which challenges that of market price, and 
may be representative of a broader set of ethical values (Arvidsson & Peitersen, 
2013). ‘Social value’ needn’t be converted into monetary form, if a new unit of 
commensuration can emerge via a commonly used platform of valuation. Techniques 
of social analytics achieve what socialist calculation could not, in identifying 
subjective valuations through tracing their real-time expressions, without any 
mediating unit of exchange value. A form of socialist calculation enacted by the 
corporation, rather than by the state, becomes entirely plausible, when seeking to 
understand the interests of consumers and high value employees.   
 
Where these infrastructures may be more governmentally transformative in future, 
however, is in tracing bio-psycho-social problems as they move through social 
networks. Chronic problems such as depression, obesity and loneliness are 
increasingly viewed as problems of public health, which move like epidemics through 
social networks (e.g. Christakis & Fowler, 2011). This poses the question of what the 
infrastructure of governance might be, which could spot and alleviate this risk of 
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contagion. The data which accumulates from digital networks is one answer, and 
where individuals can be drawn into this surveillance through contributing their own 
regular updates on mood and behavior (for instance via a smart phone) the capacity 
to achieve far-reaching, real-time surveillance of ‘wellbeing’ is very high.  
 
Governmental solutions which aim to re-build the social, through producing ‘social 
capital’ and relationships where they are absent, are at the forefront of policy thinking 
in the early 21st century in contexts such as Britain. The idea of ‘relational 
government’ has been suggested in a British context, as the successor to the more 
transactional ‘service delivery’ model of the neoliberal state (Mulgan, 2012; Muir & 
Parker, 2014). Given that such government cannot be performed purely through 
rhetorical and affective appeals to ‘mutualism’ or ‘grass roots’, the question of how to 
monitor, measure and optimize connectivity necessarily arises. It is here that the 
governmental potential of social network analysis, combined with quantitative 
measures of psychosomatic wellbeing, is becoming apparent.  
 
If the political authority of monetary calculation is to receive a significant challenge, it 
is likely to come from a different mode of materiality, namely the optimisation of the 
body. Technologies which attach themselves directly to the body, for measurement of 
stress (via pulse rate and body temperature), and communicate this information both 
to the wearer and to a centralized data bank, further push the frontier for the formal 
analysis of social life. The discovery that lonely people suffer more physical pain 
following hip operations, or that seeing another person in pain triggers the same 
neural response as actually experiencing it oneself, or that a particular part of the 
brain can be physically stimulated to produce the experience of bliss, suggests that a 
neural and biological notion of the ‘social’ may in the long-term become most 
consequential for the formation of new social governance (Rose & Abi-Rached, 
2013). These problems and discoveries rest on logics that lie entirely outside of the 
neoliberal tradition of rationalization, under any meaningful definition of the latter.    
 
 
Conclusion: The Re-birth of the Social? 
 
Foucault argues that the ‘social’ as a distinct domain of human conduct arose initially 
in the ambiguous space at the interface of state and market, where juridical and 
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market logics bleed into one another and mingle. Neoliberalism is a mode of 
rationalization that will not tolerate such ambiguity, and thereby seeks to fuse legal 
and economic logic in the style of Jeremy Bentham. Economic rationality comes to 
provide the procedures of the state; the state comes to substantiate the mechanisms 
of the market. Rather than a mingling, the two are conjoined in various forms of 
incentive-based government. Social government is considered irrational in the 
precise sense that it lacks instruments capable of commensurating value and 
performing knowledge.  
 
The new sciences of the ‘social’, led by network analysis and the psychology and 
neurology of emergent relations, do now offer rationalities that defy this precise 
neoliberal critique. The inspiration for neoliberalism was the recognition that 
knowledge of the ‘social’ was becoming increasingly monopolized by the state, and 
its associated experts. The thrust of much neoliberal critique and policy was aimed at 
deconstructing and dismantling aggregative techniques and rationalities of ‘society’, 
which obscured the logic of individual decision-making. But as recent rhetorical 
appeals to civil society and the rise of behavioural economics apparently accept, this 
largely underplayed the extent to which individual decision-making itself contains the 
germs of ‘social’ behaviour within it. In focusing primarily on the aggregative 
techniques of socialist planning, neoliberal critique somewhat under-estimated the 
potency of emergent social behaviour and normativity. Governing via relations and 
networks, to influence subjectively-held values, represents a significant departure 
from neo-liberalism. 
 
There is, however, one further domain of social conduct which is neither market, nor 
state, nor civil society, but which the neoliberal era did a great deal to expand and 
empower. This was the corporation. By many accounts, the actually-existing 
neoliberal era has been less characterized by an expansion of markets, than by an 
increase in the autonomy and size of corporations, often at the expense of 
competitive markets (Crouch, 2011). Corporations are paradoxical entities, which are 
simultaneously private assets, belonging to shareholders, and associations of 
people. Neoliberal theory explicitly treats them only as the former, as demonstrated 
by the doctrine of ‘shareholder value’, while assuming that their internal hierarchy 
must functionally be an efficient means of minimizing ‘transaction costs’ (Lazonick & 
O’Sullivan, 2000). But if the social is understood as the buffer zone between the 
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juridical and the economic, neoliberalism arguably did allow for an autonomous 
space of ‘social’ conduct in workplaces and branded lifestyles, but simply refused to 
name it as such. Social psychology, of the sort developed by Moreno, has a long and 
well-analysed history of shaping new types of management of enterprises.  
 
A final proposition that is worth considering is that the new ‘social’ that is emerging 
alongside or after neoliberalism is a case of the corporation being turned inside out. 
Rationalities and techniques developed for the creation of committed relationships, 
and put in the hands of human resource managers and marketers, are being pushed 
outwards for the management of much larger populations. Techniques of ‘control’, 
which arose for purposes of business management (Beniger, 1986) break their limits, 
and become used for the constant surveillance of all, producing a ‘control society’ 
(Deleuze, 1992). The revived ‘social’ moves beyond the state-market fusion of 
neoliberalism, towards a new management of everyday life, beyond the boundaries 
of any individual enterprise. In a perverse way, this is as Lenin predicted: “the whole 
of society will have become a single office and a single factory” (quoted in Steele, 
1992: 68). 
 
There is political potential in this new social, not least for the opportunities it offers to 
criticize policies and practices which threaten to render productive and healthy 
relations impossible. The critical question is whether new techniques of the social 
could ever launch autonomous communities, capable of subverting or de-stablising 
the existing order. The anchoring of social media in shareholder-owned corporations 
suggests that the de-coupling of the new social from economic rationality is currently 
unlikely, as does the increasing interpenetration of health and economic policy, via 
categories of ‘wellbeing’. Added to this political disappointment is the discovery, 
thanks to Snowden, that social technologies are also anchored in exceptional 
sovereign rationalities, of the security services. The somewhat pessimistic conclusion 
to draw, therefore, is that a new form of the ‘social’ has arisen that isn’t entirely 
reducible to market or state logic. But its mediation between the two is not a sign of 
relative autonomy, as the original ideal of ‘civil society’ had posited, but serves to 
glue law and economics together in a new way, more tightly than ever before.    
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Endnotes 
                                                
i ‘Social prescribing’ refers to the practice of prescribing activities, such as 
gardening, singing, fishing and dancing, as a means of restoring 
psychosomatic wellbeing. It may involve formal or informal alliances between 
medical practitioners and social enterprises, in order to deliver the activities 
concerned.  
